AhlulBayt News Agency: More than 130 years ago, Abdur Rahman Khan launched a brutal campaign against Hazara leaders, seized their lands and dismantled traditional power structures in Hazarajat. Today, renewed pressure on tribal and religious figures, particularly in Hazara- and Shiite-populated areas, has prompted questions about whether Afghanistan’s independent social structures are once again being weakened and dismantled.**
In a village in Daikundi province, a man who had long been respected as a local elder was shot dead inside his home at night. In Samangan, another tribal elder was killed at his residence by unidentified armed men. In Ghazni, meanwhile, the family of a prominent local figure said they received him in a coma after he had spent three nights in Taliban custody.
The incidents occurred in different parts of Afghanistan, and no evidence has so far established a direct connection between those responsible. However, they share a troubling feature: the victims were individuals with considerable standing and influence in their local communities.
In a country where traditional social structures continue to play an important role in resolving disputes, defending public interests and communicating with authorities, the killing or detention of a community elder is not merely a personal tragedy. Such incidents can undermine social relations, public trust and the ability of communities to pursue collective demands.
For Afghanistan’s Hazara and Shiite communities, these developments also revive painful historical memories of a period when local and religious leaders were among the first targets of Abdur Rahman Khan’s campaign to consolidate central authority.
Killings in Daikundi and Samangan: Perpetrators Remain Unknown
On Friday, 8 Aqrab, Ghulam Mohammad, a respected local elder from the Ghochān area of Shahristan district in Daikundi province, was shot dead at his home.
According to local reports, the attacker or attackers fired at him through a bedroom window. Some sources said he was performing prayers when he was targeted.
Local sources described Ghulam Mohammad as an influential community figure with no known political or military activities.
Following news of the killing, some of his relatives raised the possibility of revenge by individuals affiliated with the Taliban, claiming that he had not maintained good relations with the group.
Taliban officials in Daikundi denied that their forces were involved, describing the incident as the result of a personal dispute and saying efforts were underway to identify those responsible.
No independent evidence has so far conclusively confirmed either account.
A few days later, on the evening of Monday, 11 Aqrab, Haji Abdul Karim, another local elder from Shahr-e Naw village in Khuram-o-Sarbagh district of Samangan province, was also killed at his home by unidentified armed men.
Local sources said the attackers entered his residence and shot him. Their identities and motives remain unknown.
Although insufficient information has been released about Haji Abdul Karim’s ethnic or religious background, the timing of his killing, following the murder of a local elder in Daikundi, has heightened concerns about the safety of influential community figures.
It may be difficult to attribute either killing directly to the Taliban. Nevertheless, incidents of this nature in areas where Taliban security forces are responsible for maintaining public safety underscore the need for transparent investigations and accountability.
Ghazni: Local Elder Returned to Family in a Coma After Detention
In another case, local sources in Ghazni reported the detention of Haji Ali Khan, an influential figure from Tamaki village in Qarabagh district.
According to these sources, Taliban forces detained him on allegations of possessing weapons. After three nights in custody, he was returned to his family in a coma.
Reports indicate that the Taliban had demanded that he hand over four firearms or pay 160,000 Afghanis for each weapon.
Following his release, Haji Ali Khan was admitted to a hospital in Kabul, where his condition was described as critical.
The details of his interrogation and the precise cause of his deteriorating health have not been independently verified. However, returning a detainee to his family in a coma raises serious concerns about possible torture or mistreatment in custody.
Unlike the unresolved killings in Daikundi and Samangan, local sources directly identified the Taliban as responsible for Haji Ali Khan’s detention. The authorities holding him therefore have a particular responsibility to clarify the circumstances of his custody and the injuries he reportedly sustained.
Kunduz: Tribal Elders Detained After Protesting Mining Activities
In Kunduz province, local sources also reported that Taliban forces detained five tribal elders in Aqtash district.
the arrests followed public protests against irregular gold-mining activities and the publication of information about mining operations.
Residents alleged that individuals affiliated with the Taliban were demanding 3,000 Afghanis from workers for every gold-extraction shaft they dug. Reports also emerged of mistreatment involving at least two of those detained.
Local sources said mining activities near homes, agricultural land and public facilities had raised concerns about damage to the living environment of rural residents.
The tribal elders had apparently intervened as representatives of community concerns. Rather than receiving a transparent response to the complaints, however, they were reportedly detained.
Although this incident has no established direct connection to Afghanistan’s Shiite community, it is significant in assessing the position of local elders within the Taliban’s system of governance.
The Role of Tribal Elders in Afghanistan: More Than a Social Title
In many rural Afghan communities, tribal elders, religious scholars and local influential figures have traditionally performed functions that, in other countries, are often carried out by civil and administrative institutions.
Their responsibilities include mediating family and property disputes, resolving conflicts over water and land, communicating with government officials, pursuing public interests and preserving cultural traditions.
These traditional structures have not always been free from inequality or abuses of authority. Nevertheless, in many areas they have remained among the few available channels through which communities can pursue collective demands.
For Afghanistan’s Hazara and Shiite communities, the importance of these figures is closely linked to their particular historical experience.
During periods when Hazaras were excluded from meaningful participation in formal government institutions, local elders and religious scholars played a significant role in maintaining social cohesion, resolving disputes and defending collective interests.
Under such circumstances, undermining the position of a local elder can mean more than removing an influential individual. It may also affect an entire network of social relationships and mechanisms for collective protection.
This issue has a painful precedent in Hazara history.
Abdur Rahman Khan: Suppressing Shiite Leaders to Consolidate Central Power
Understanding the historical importance of tribal elders in Hazara and Shiite society requires looking back to the late 19th century, when Abdur Rahman Khan, ruler of Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901, sought to extend the authority of the central government across the country.
At the time, parts of Hazarajat maintained local systems of governance and a degree of autonomy. Social and political affairs in these areas were largely managed by influential local leaders and families.
As he expanded central authority, Abdur Rahman Khan pursued policies that included disarmament, increased taxation, the appointment of government officials and restrictions on the influence of local leaders.
Historical research records cases in which his government’s representatives arrested, imprisoned and executed Hazara elders in several areas.
At the same time, disputes over land and pasture intensified, and portions of Hazara land were transferred to other groups.
These measures provoked widespread resistance.
In 1888, a number of Hazara leaders from Sheikh Ali participated in the uprising of Muhammad Ishaq, a rival of Abdur Rahman Khan. In subsequent years, pressure from the central government intensified, and dissatisfaction spread across different parts of Hazarajat.
In the spring of 1892, a major uprising against Abdur Rahman Khan’s government began, eventually spreading across large parts of Hazara-populated territory. Muhammad Azim Beg, an influential leader from Daizangi, was among those who joined the resistance.
What followed was not simply an administrative dispute between the government and local leaders. It developed into a large-scale conflict with profound ethnic, religious and humanitarian consequences.
Abdur Rahman Khan exploited religious divisions and issued a jihad decree against Shiites, mobilising large forces to suppress the Hazara resistance.
During 1892 and 1893, various parts of Hazarajat witnessed bloody battles, mass killings, displacement and the destruction of social structures.
Historical researchers have documented that thousands of Hazaras were killed or sold into slavery, while many families were forced to abandon their homes and land.
Estimates of the exact death toll and the proportion of the population lost during this period vary, and some widely cited figures remain methodologically disputed. However, the large-scale killings, enslavement and forced displacement of Hazaras are established in credible historical records.
A Campaign That Destroyed More Than Military Resistance
One of the most significant consequences of the repression under Abdur Rahman Khan was the weakening of Hazara leadership and traditional social organisation.
During the conflicts, numerous local leaders were killed, imprisoned or forced to flee. Many families lost their land, while the historical relationship between the population, its territory and traditional power structures was transformed.
These developments affected not only the economic position of the Hazaras but also their political influence and ability to defend their collective interests.
As a result, a community that had previously maintained relatively autonomous local structures in parts of Hazarajat came under much closer supervision by the central government.
Population displacement and changes in land ownership also had long-lasting consequences, some of which continued to shape land and pasture disputes in later periods.
For this reason, the repression under Abdur Rahman Khan cannot be understood merely as a series of military operations. It had far-reaching effects on local power structures, social relations, economic conditions and the historical memory of the Hazara community.
From the Past to the Present: Are Independent Community Leaders Being Weakened Again?
More than 130 years later, Afghanistan’s political and social circumstances have changed fundamentally.
International human rights frameworks have emerged, education and media have expanded, and traditional systems of community leadership have also evolved.
The present situation in Afghanistan therefore cannot be directly equated with the era of Abdur Rahman Khan without taking these historical differences into account.
Nevertheless, comparing certain mechanisms of power in the two periods raises important questions.
Under Abdur Rahman Khan, restricting the authority of local leaders, disarming communities, seizing land and suppressing resistance were among the tools used to expand central control.
In contemporary Afghanistan, human rights reports have documented the detention of protesters and local figures, restrictions on independent institutions, property disputes and the reduced presence of Hazaras and Shiites in decision-making structures.
The potential similarity between the two periods lies not necessarily in identical methods or motives, but in the possibility that local communities are losing their ability to organise independently, defend collective rights and participate in decision-making.
This comparison does not establish the existence of a single coordinated plan or a nationwide order by the Taliban to kill tribal elders. It does, however, provide serious grounds for examining the consequences of current policies.
What Do Human Rights Reports Reveal?
Concerns about the safety of tribal and religious leaders are not based solely on the latest incidents.
The human rights organisation Rawadari reported that at least 251 people were killed or injured in targeted attacks, suspicious killings and cases of extrajudicial violence by Taliban forces or unidentified individuals during the first half of 2025.
According to the report, the number of victims in these incidents had increased by approximately 30 per cent compared with the same period in 2024.
The victims included former government employees and people accused of links to Taliban opponents, as well as tribal elders and influential local figures.
Rawadari also reported at least 27 cases of disappearances across six Afghan provinces during the first half of 2025.
The organisation identified tribal and religious elders, alongside former government employees and people accused of cooperating with opposition groups, as among those vulnerable to enforced disappearance.
These findings suggest that violence and detention involving local community figures are not limited to the incidents reported in recent days.
Previous Rawadari reports have also documented cases of the detention, torture and killing of tribal elders by Taliban forces.
Afghanistan’s Shiite Community: Pressure on Leaders Alongside Restrictions on Religious Institutions
The situation of Afghanistan’s Shiite community is particularly significant because reported pressure on local figures has coincided with other restrictions affecting the community’s religious, educational and social institutions.
In its 2026 report, the European Union Agency for Asylum referred to multiple cases of discrimination against Hazaras and Shiites in access to government employment, public services, land-dispute resolution and the organisation of religious ceremonies.
The report also highlighted the limited representation of Hazaras in the Taliban government and the consequences this has for their access to services and justice.
In recent years, reports have emerged of the detention of Shiite clerics, restrictions on Muharram ceremonies, property disputes in Hazara-populated areas and the forced displacement of families.
Human Rights Watch also reported in October 2021 that the Taliban and forces affiliated with them had evicted Hazara families from their homes and land in several provinces.
In one of the largest documented cases, at least 2,800 Hazara residents in Daikundi and Uruzgan were reportedly forced to leave their homes.
According to a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report in October 2026, at least 10 institutions associated with the Shiite community were closed or had their operating licences revoked during September, while at least 40 people were detained in connection with these centres.
The institutions included religious, educational and cultural facilities.
The Taliban have cited state ownership of land or regulatory violations as reasons for some of these actions. However, officials and supporters of the affected institutions have challenged the decisions.
Taken together, these developments have increased concerns about the shrinking capacity of Afghanistan’s Shiite community to manage independent institutions and pursue public demands.
Could the Removal of Community Leaders Undermine Collective Identity?
A community’s identity is not defined solely by its language, religion or historical monuments. It is also reflected in its institutions, social relationships, traditions and the individuals who preserve its historical experiences and represent its collective concerns.
In many parts of Afghanistan, tribal and religious elders serve as representatives of this collective memory.
They may have witnessed historical land disputes, helped establish local agreements or acted as intermediaries between communities and those in power.
Under such circumstances, physically eliminating or intimidating these figures can weaken a community’s ability to preserve historical experience and defend shared interests.
This is particularly important for the Hazaras, whose modern history is closely associated with displacement, loss of land, the suppression of local leaders and the struggle for equal representation in Afghanistan’s political system.
However, the collective identity of Hazaras and Shiites is not dependent on a handful of individuals. Nor would the removal of a particular institution or community elder inevitably destroy that identity.
Despite extensive historical pressures, Afghanistan’s Shiite community has preserved much of its cultural identity through families, education, religious institutions, literature and social networks.
The priority today is to protect the very capacities that allow this identity to endure and be passed on to future generations.
Mysterious Killings: Where Does the Taliban’s Responsibility Begin and End?
One of the central questions surrounding the recent killings is whether those responsible may have links to security institutions or individuals affiliated with the Taliban.
In Ghulam Mohammad’s case, some local sources raised the possibility of revenge, but Taliban officials rejected the allegation.
In Haji Abdul Karim’s case, the attackers and their motives remain unknown.
It would therefore be journalistically and legally indefensible to attribute either killing conclusively to the Taliban without independent evidence.
However, the fact that the perpetrators remain unidentified does not absolve the authorities of responsibility.
The Taliban currently control Afghanistan’s security, law enforcement and judicial institutions. They are therefore responsible for investigating the killing of civilians, threats against local figures and allegations of mistreatment of detainees.
Government responsibility in such cases has two distinct dimensions. The first concerns direct responsibility where misconduct by officials is established. The second concerns the obligation to protect citizens and conduct effective investigations into crimes committed by unidentified perpetrators.
The growing number of reported killings, detentions and acts of violence against local figures does not, by itself, prove the existence of a hidden coordinated campaign or government support for such crimes. However, it strengthens the case for investigating possible involvement by officials, deliberate negligence or impunity for those responsible.
Clarifying these cases requires examining any threats made before the killings, possible links between the attackers and armed groups, the response of security institutions, medical evidence and testimony from victims’ families.
Without independent investigations and the publication of verifiable findings, uncertainty surrounding these cases could deepen public distrust and increase the sense of insecurity.
From Historical Repression to the Need to Prevent Its Recurrence
The persecution of Hazaras under Abdur Rahman Khan remains deeply embedded in the community’s historical memory not only because of the number of victims, but also because its consequences for land ownership, ethnic relations, social status and local power structures continued for generations.
One of the most important lessons of that period is that damage to community leadership institutions can have consequences extending far beyond the immediate period of violence.
Today, too, the killing of a tribal elder, detention of a religious scholar, closure of an educational centre or forced displacement of families may affect far more people than those directly targeted.
In areas where Shiite and Hazara communities face limited access to formal structures of power, weakening independent social institutions can intensify feelings of exclusion and insecurity.
Nevertheless, none of these similarities alone proves that the Taliban are implementing the same programme pursued by Abdur Rahman Khan.
The repression of the late 19th century involved large-scale warfare, mass killings, enslavement and forced population displacement. Establishing that a comparable plan is being repeated today would require evidence far beyond scattered reports of killings and detentions.
But preventing a recurrence of historical atrocities does not require waiting until conditions reach the same level of devastation.
History warns that neglecting minority rights, restricting political representation, weakening social institutions and allowing perpetrators of violence to escape accountability can have devastating consequences for a community.
Afghanistan Must Not Witness the Silencing of Its Social Memory Again
In Afghanistan, tribal elders, religious scholars and independent community figures form part of the network connecting ordinary people with those in positions of power.
Protecting their lives and rights does not mean endorsing all their views or actions. It is part of the broader responsibility to preserve social security and ensure that citizens can pursue their demands peacefully.
The killing of Ghulam Mohammad in Daikundi, the murder of Haji Abdul Karim in Samangan, the alarming condition of Haji Ali Khan following his detention in Ghazni and reports of tribal elders being arrested in Kunduz all underline the urgent need for transparent and independent investigations.
For Afghanistan’s Hazara and Shiite communities, these incidents take on particular significance against a historical backdrop in which memories of the suppression of local leaders, dispossession and forced displacement remain alive.
The history of Abdur Rahman Khan serves as a reminder that the repression of a community does not occur solely through the killing of its members. Weakening social institutions, denying people the right to participate in decision-making and eliminating their ability to defend their collective interests can also produce deep and lasting consequences.
At the same time, preventing history from repeating itself requires an accurate assessment of present-day realities: neither attributing every unexplained killing to the government without evidence nor accepting official accounts without independent scrutiny.
The Taliban have a responsibility to answer questions about the recent killings, the fate of detainees and allegations of torture and threats against tribal elders.
The international community and human rights organisations should also work to document rights violations, support victims’ families and ensure independent investigations into violence against community figures.
If Afghanistan is to break away from its cycle of violence, no tribal elder, religious scholar or independent citizen should have to fear for their safety in their own home simply for defending public interests. No killing, regardless of the victim’s identity, should be allowed to remain without investigation and accountability.
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